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Looking Over a Crowd and Picking
Your Friends: Civil Rights and the
Debate Over the Influence of Foreign
and International Human Rights Law
on the Interpretation of the
U.S. Constitution
BySTANLEY A. HALPIN*
"Our problem has to be internationalized."
- Malcolm X, 19651
Introduction
Efforts to bring about equal civil rights for African Americans
have often included calls to approach the problem internationally.
While some movement has been made in this direction, it has been
insufficiently energetic. The United States has historically opposed
applying international human rights law to its own policies. However,
the question of the proper influence of foreign and international
human rights law upon U.S. constitutional rights has generated a
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Lafayette, 1964. I wish to thank participants of the conference, Reflections on Rights
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supported by a research grant from the Southern University Law Center, Fred
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1. MALCOLM X, MALCOLM X SPEAKS 218 (George Breitman ed. 1965) (radio
broadcast just before his death in 1965). For one response to this cry, see Dorothy Q.
Thomas, Advancing Rights Protection in the United States: An Internationalized
Advocacy Strategy, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 15, 16 (1996).
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robust dialogue. One of the last shots fired in this skirmish was by
Chief Justice John Roberts, who at his confirmation hearings likened
this methodology to "looking out over a crowd and picking out your
friends."2  This article identifies and evaluates efforts to utilize
international and foreign law to advance civil rights3 in the United
States. I will examine early efforts of civil rights advocates, and then
focus on the impact that international human rights norms are having
on affirmative action, the current leading civil rights issue. I will also
examine slavery reparations, another significant contemporary civil
rights issue.
Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court's record on civil rights has
been mixed. The Court's 19th century decisions in Dred Scott' and
the Civil Rights Cases' were a blow to civil rights efforts. During the
seventeen-year Warren Court era, the Court demonstrated sensitivity
to civil rights claims. More recently, in 1989, the Court decided
Croson,6 which severely limits affirmative action, and several cases
which gut Title VII, the employment discrimination provision of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.' From a Civil rights viewpoint, the term of
Croson was the term from hell. Currently, the Court is criticized for
falling off in areas of concern to the black community, including
affirmative action and freedom from racist speech. Claims for slavery
reparations have yet to be heard by the Supreme Court, and have not
even found a sympathetic ear in the lower courts. Not surprisingly,
the Supreme Court now lags behind as a protector of civil liberties,
often surpassed by its international counterparts.8
In recent times, the Supreme Court has cited international
human rights law in deciding individual rights cases favorable to
claimants. Most notably, in Lawrence v, Texas,9 the Court reversed
2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Adam Liptak, Courts In Transition: The Overview;
Roberts Fields Ouestions on Privacy and Precedents, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 14, 2005, at
Al.
3. The term civil rights is used herein in its traditional meaning of rights
important to the African-American community and associated with the Civil Rights
Movement.
4. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
5. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
6. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
7. E.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
8. See, e.g., Drew Days, American Constitution Society Supreme Court Round
Up, 11-12 (July 1, 2003), available at <www.acslaw.org/files/2004%20programs-
Supreme%20Court%20review-panel%20transcript.pdf>.
9. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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its ten-year precedent of Bowers v. Hardwick "o with an explicit
reference to international human rights decisions as an aid to
interpreting the U.S. Constitution." In the previous term, in Atkins v.
Virginia,12 the Court specifically referred to international human
rights law as support for changing the standard of decency relevant to
the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The
Court held in Atkins that the execution of a mentally retarded person
violates this standard.'3
In the same term, the Court also moved closer to norms in
international human rights law on two issues especially important to
the African-American community, hate speech and affirmative
action. In Grutter v. Bollinger,14 the Court accepted Michigan Law
School's argument that diversity justifies considering race as a factor
in admissions and that it satisfies the equal protection standard of
strict scrutiny. In Virginia v. Black,'" the Court refused to recognize
cross burning as protected speech, upholding the state's law against
such acts.
Part I of this article examines historical efforts of civil rights
advocates to utilize international human rights law and identifies four
primary theories for the application of international norms to
domestic rights issues. Part II analyzes the U.S. Supreme Court's
historical relationship with international and foreign human rights
law. Part III compares international human rights law regarding
affirmative action to the development of affirmative action in the U.S.
Supreme Court. This Part also identifies potential methods for
advancing domestic civil rights by applying international human rights
norms. Part IV concludes with an evaluation of how claims for
slavery reparations can be made in the United States based on
international human rights norms.
I. Early Efforts of Civil Rights Advocates to Utilize
International Human Rights Law
There are four models regarding the enforcement of
international human rights law in the United States. The first, the
10. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
11. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-574 (2003).
12. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
13. Id.
14. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
15. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362-363 (2003).
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international enforcement model, asserts that international norms are
directly binding on the United States and can be enforced through an
international tribunal or organization. The second, the domestic
enforcement model, asserts that the international norms must be
enforced by U.S. courts for one of two reasons: because the United
States has a treaty obligation, or because customary international law
binds the United States. The third approach, the interpretive
mandate, asserts that U.S. courts must interpret statutory and
constitutional rights consistently with international norms. The final
approach, the persuasive model, asserts that U.S. courts need only
consult an international norm for its persuasive value. The legal
history and development of these models has been closely tied to the
Civil Rights Movement. This article analyzes the efforts of civil rights
advocates to use these models in U.S. courts.
The first model, direct enforcement by international tribunals or
organizations, has met little success. This is largely due to the United
States' strong influence over international organizations since World
War II. Civil rights advocates have attempted to present claims of
deprivation of the rights of African Americans directly to
international organizations. 16 Before the ink was dry on the U.N.
Charter, African-American civil rights groups petitioned the United
Nations to help end racial discrimination within the United States.
The League of Nations Charter lacked any reference to racial
discrimination. However, the framers of the U.N. Charter, reacting to
Nazi Germany's doctrine of racial supremacy, included strong
language condemning racial discrimination. In Article I, the U.N.
Charter provides that a primary purpose of the Charter is to attain
"human rights.., for all without distinction as to race.' ' 17  Other
articles, especially Article 55 which requires respect "for the principle
16. These early efforts are set out by Charles P. Henry and Tunua Thrash in U.S.
Human Rights Petitions before the UN, 26 THE BLACK SCHOLAR 60 (1996). Gay J.
McDougall has provided an excellent summary of these efforts in her introduction to
a 1997 Howard Law Journal symposium on the then newly ratified CERD. See Gay
J. McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International Regime: The Domestic Relevance
of International Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40 How.
L.J. 571 (1997). One of the articles in this symposium also provides a section on
blacks' historical appeal to international human rights law. See Nkechi Taifa,
Codification or Castration? The Applicability of the International Convention to
Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination to the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 40
How. L.J. 641, 643-48.
17. U.N. Charter art. 1, 3.
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of equal rights," reinforce the anti-racial discrimination mandate. 8
Availing themselves of these provisions, civil rights groups filed
petitions with the United Nations in 1946, 1947, and 1951.'9 In 1946,
the National Negro Congress petitioned the United Nations to
conduct studies, make recommendations, and to take other
appropriate steps to end racial discrimination in the United States."
The petition was supported by U.S. governmental data demonstrating
the severe disparity between African Americans and whites along
socioeconomic lines and the disenfranchisement and denial of other
basic civil rights of blacks, as well as violence exacted against them.21
The U.N. General Assembly took no action and essentially ignored
the petition.2
Due in large part to the influence of W.E.B. Du Bois, the
NAACP filed a more extensive petition, An Appeal to the World,23
with the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations. The
petition was referred to a U.N. Sub-Commission, where it was
defeated four to one. The United States opposed the petition and
voted against it in the subcommittee. Eleanor Roosevelt, who was an
influential delegate on the Human Rights Commission argued that
the airing of the United States' treatment of African Americans in an
open international forum would be harmful to the prestige of the
United States.24
The first multilateral human rights treaty developed under the
auspices of the United Nations, the Genocide Convention, prohibited
the promotion of racial genocide "in whole or part."25 As soon as the
Genocide Convention went into force in 1951,26 the Civil Rights
18. U.N. Charter art. 55 c; see also U.N. Charter arts. 62, 68 (regarding the duty
of the Economic and Social Council); U.N. Charter arts. 73, 76 (regarding the
administration of the trust territories).
19. Henry, supra note 16, at 62-67.
20. Id at 62 (citing National Negro Congress, A Petition to the United Nations
on behalf of 13 Million oppressed Negro citizens of the United States of America,
June 6, 1946, p.7).
21. Id
22. Id at 62-63.
23. Id at 64 (citing NAACP, An Appeal to the World, New York: NAACP,
1947).
24. Id. at 64-65.
25. Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (III),
Art. II, U.N. Doc. No. A/810 (Dec. 9, 1948).
26. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, when 20 states, including the United States,
signed. However, the Genocide Convention was not ratified by the United States
until Nov. 25, 1988.
2006]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Congress filed a petition alleging genocide, as defined in Article 2 of
the treaty, against African Americans." The United States again
28successfully opposed any formal hearing on this petition.
While these petitions failed to obtain formal legal relief, their
political effect in supporting civil rights for African Americans in.the
United States was probably considerable. The petitions were well
publicized and there is no question that the continued oppression of
blacks in the United States was an obstacle in U.S. diplomatic
relations and international political struggles in the Cold War. 9
Unfortunately, these early attempts by civil rights advocates to apply
international human rights law to domestic violations have set the
tone that prevails today with regard to the international enforcement
model.
In the 1960s, civil rights advocates continued attempts to use the
international enforcement model to enforce domestic civil rights. In a
1963 Columbia Law Review article,3 ° Jack Greenburg, then executive
director of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, called attention to the
international human rights movement, noting that several
international courts, particularly the European Court of Human
Rights, had established precedent that a national supreme court
decision could be reviewed by an international court. However,
Greenburg was not optimistic that the United States would submit its
Supreme Court to the authority of an international court. He
concluded that
[a]t this stage in history... whether the United States would adhere
to such a treaty - granting the right of individual petition to
challenge decisions of the United States Supreme Court on
questions of liberty - can best be indicated by the American refusal
to agree to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice."
The domestic enforcement model, which advocates enforcement
of international human rights norms by U.S. courts, depends upon the
existence of such a norm by treaty, or by customary international law.
27. Henry, supra note 16, at 66.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 66 (citing Secretary of State Dean Acheson as acknowledging this in
1947).
30. Jack Greenberg & Anthony R. Shalit, New Horizons for Human Rights" The
European Convention, Court, and Commission of Human Rights, 63 COLUM. L.
REV. 1384 (1963).
31. Id at 1412.
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Treaty enforcement should be the more effective approach 2
However, in the 1950s, the domestic enforcement model based on
treaties was severely limited by politics surrounding the Bricker
Amendment. Although the Bricker Amendment failed to pass, its
short-term and long-term political effect was a severe blow to
international human rights efforts and seriously limited the domestic
enforcement model.
The Bricker Amendment, named for Senator John Bricker of
Ohio, would have amended the Constitution to prohibit domestic
enforcement of treaties without Congressional approval.33 The
Bricker Amendment movement was in part a response to attempts by
civil rights advocates to employ human rights treaty provisions to
protect African Americans from discrimination. This appeared
possible after Justice Holmes's 1920 opinion in Missouri v. Holland,'
which utilized treaties to enforce domestic civil rights. In Holland,
Missouri sought an injunction against a U.S. game warden for
enforcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act on grounds that the
Act unconstitutionally interfered with Missouri's rights under the
Tenth Amendment.35 The United States ratified a treaty limiting the
killing of migratory birds which fly between Canada and the United
States.36 Pursuant to the treaty, Congress enacted the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act,37 which restricted hunting of the birds in the United
States. Because a domestic statute enforced the treaty, the case
presented no issue of whether the treaty was self-executing. The Act,
however, allowed the expansion of congressional power at the
expense of the states. Supporters of the Bricker Amendment
("Brickerites") were concerned that Congress could regulate racial
38
discrimination in states by either ratifying self-executing treaties, or
32. In Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), the U.S. Supreme Court
observed that international law is incorporated into U.S. law by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, that signed and ratified treaties are the
"the supreme law of the land."
33. There were differently worded proposals between 1950 and 1954 with one
falling only a little short of the two-thirds required to initiate the process of
amendment. Treaties and Executive Agreements, S.J. Res. 1-A, 83d Cong. (1953);
S.J. Res. 43, 83d Cong. (1954).
34. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 431. Justice Holmes summarized this treaty of December 8, 1916 with
Great Britain without further citation.
37. This statute as it existed at the time can be found at the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act of July 3, 1918, 40 Stat. 755.
38. The U.S. court-created doctrine regarding self-executing treaties was first
20061
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by executing treaties which forbade racial discrimination.
Under Holland, a congressional act made pursuant to a validly
executed treaty could go beyond Congress's otherwise enumerated
powers and still remain unrestricted by the Tenth Amendment. 9 At
the time of Holland, Congress's commerce power did not extend to
wildlife4 ° and Missouri claimed sovereignty over regulation of wildlife
under the Tenth Amendment. Justice Holmes reasoned that a treaty
signed by the President and ratified by the Senate was "under the
authority of the United States" as required by the Constitution and
need not be "pursuant to the Constitution" as would laws of
Congress.' Thus when Congress enforces a treaty, that act prevails
over state law because of the Supremacy Clause. Although Holmes
tempered his opinion by noting that "the treaty in question does not
contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution," 2
the Brickerites perceived the decision as a threat to state power.
When the Bricker Amendment was considered in the 1950s, the Civil
Rights Movement, bolstered by African-American World War II
veterans, was beginning to make waves. Brickerites claimed to be
defending national sovereignty, but their real concern appeared to be
defending state sovereignty and preserving the ability of southern
states to maintain segregation and white supremacy in the face of the
U.N. Charter. 43
articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314
(1829). Claimants sought title to land in West Florida based on a Spanish land grant
confirmed in a treaty between Spain and the United States. Marshall set forth the
rule of self-execution without so naming it:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is
consequently to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative
provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract.., the
treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the
Court.
-d. at 258. The Court determined that the treaty was not self-executing, meaning
Congress had to act for it to be enforced. Since Congress did not enforce the treaty,
the claimants lost. See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
760 (1988) for a detailed study of the emergence and development of this unique
court-made American doctrine.
39. Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
40. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 535 (1896).
41. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
42. Id.
43. See Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and
Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REv. 671, 703 (1998).
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In 1950, a California court decision did in fact use the U.N.
Charter to invalidate, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, a state law
denying land ownership to certain Asian aliens. In SeiFujii v. State,'
the court held that the U.N. Charter's human rights provisions were
self-executing and therefore domestically enforceable. On appeal,
the California Supreme Court circumvented the issue by affirming the
case on equal protection grounds.45  Although the court did not
address whether the U.N. Charter could be enforced domestically, the
issue of whether a treaty is self-executing depends on a court's
interpretation of the perceived intent of the treaty. Treaties silent on
the issue of self-execution are open to interpretation by courts46 and
can be directly enforced by courts.
In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Reid v. Cover 8 that a
treaty allowing Great Britain to prosecute American military
dependants in Great Britain violated a defendant's constitutional
right to a jury trial. The Court affirmed that the Constitution trumps
treaties, which was no surprise. Nevertheless, the Court has
discretion to interpret the meaning of the Constitution, the meaning
of a treaty, and whether the two conflict. Unless one believes in the
first Justice Robert's yardstick rule,49 these human rights treaties may
impact U.S. constitutional law.
The Bricker Amendment was only defeated because President
Eisenhower, promised not to agree to human rights treaties."
Adhering to the spirit of the policy that defeated the Bricker
Amendment, the United States has been reluctant to agree to human
44. 217 P.2d 481 (1950).
45. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.2d 718 (1952).
46. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829). Foster lays out the basic principle
that intent of the parties is determined first by the explicit provisions of the treaty
and then, if necessary, by circumstances of its adoption. A treaty directed to the
courts of a nation is considered self-executing, whereas one directed at legislatures
requires statutory implementation and is not self-executing.
47. See David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional
Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2002), for a compelling argument that the intent
standard is based on an invalid premise and should be abandoned.
48. 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1957).
49. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936) ("When an act of Congress is
appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional
mandate, the judicial branch of the government has only one duty; to lay the article
of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to
decide whether the latter squares with the former").
50. See W. Michael Reisman, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions:
The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
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rights treaties ever since. The few human rights treaties that the
United States has ratified have included extensive reservations,
understandings, and declarations (RUDs)' Typically, the United
States has stipulated that treaty provisions are to be understood as
coextensive with U.S. constitutional rights, as interpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court, and that the treaty is not self-executing. 2 Thus,
human rights treaties signed and ratified by the United States may
not necessarily be enforced domestically by U.S. courts because of the
non-self execution rule, and because the United States insists on
extensive RUDs.
The use of customary international law as a basis for the
domestic enforcement model may have greater potential for success.
In 1900, the Supreme Court's holding in Paquete Habana53
established that customary international law is binding on U.S. courts.
In that case, the Paquete Habana and the Lola, Cuban fishing boats,
were captured by U.S. warships during the Spanish American War.
The owners of the boats sued in federal court and the United States
claimed the boats were legitimately captured as "prizes of war." The
Supreme Court refused the government's claim on the basis that
customary international law barred the seizure of neutral fishing
boats as prizes of war. Significantly, the Court carefully spelled out
the steps in proving a rule of customary international law.54 A
principle is considered customary international law if the consistent
and uniform practice of nations has ripened into a rule accepted by
the nations of the world as binding. This acceptance need not be
unanimous or long-standing." The American Law Institute's
Restatement on the Foreign Relations Law recognizes this principle
and describes it as "a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation., 56 Inclusion of this
principle in the Restatement is significant because it is generally
recognized that the Restatement accurately sets out rules of
51. See, e.g., US. Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 140 Cong.
Rec. 14326 (1994).
52. Id
53. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900),
54. Id at 686-711.
55. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Denmark, F.R.G. v. The
Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(c)(2)
(1987).
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international law accepted by the United States as binding. As
applied specifically to human rights, the Second Circuit held in
Filartiga v. Pena-lralt7 that customary international law prohibited
officially sanctioned torture. The court cited human rights provisions
of the U.N. Charter, provisions in several multilateral treaties
outlawing torture, resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly, and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as evidence of acceptance of
this rule in international practice. 8  Although the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty, it is often cited as part of
customary international law. Thus, if one can establish that
customary international law prohibits slavery, apartheid, or racial
hate speech, or that it supports affirmative action or slavery
reparations, then such a principle would be binding on U.S. courts. 9
The third enforcement model, the interpretive mandate, has a
strong basis in U.S. law. The Supreme Court has established that
rights provisions in the Constitution must be interpreted consistently
with international law. This enforcement model does not necessarily
establish that the United States is bound by an international norm in
the absence of a constitutional basis, but the rule is well established
and may be more palatable to courts. The rule was first announced in
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy by Chief Justice Marshall:
"[A]n Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains. ' 6°  The
approach has been accepted in a number of cases. In 1924, in
Asakura v. Seattle,6 the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance
requiring pawnbrokers to be citizens because is conflicted with a
trade treaty with Japan. In 1982, the Supreme Court again cited
Chief Justice Marshall's rule regarding international law as binding.62
Justice Rehnquist stated that the principle of interpreting the
Constitution in a manner consistent with international law "was
applied to avoid construing the National Labor Relations Act in a
manner contrary to State Department regulations, for such a
57. 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
58. Id. at 881-885.
59. See Connie de la Vega, The Right to Equal Education: Merely a Guiding
Principle or Customary International Legal Right? 11 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 37
(1994) for a compelling argument that customary international law requires equal
educational opportunity regardless of wealth.
60. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
61. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 343 (1924).
62. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456.U.S. 25, 28-29 (1982).
2006]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
construction would have had foreign policy implications... [and]
would have been contrary to a well-established rule of international
law." 63 Thus, the argument that constitutional rights should be
interpreted consistently with international human rights law remains
quite viable.
The last model simply calls for U.S. courts to consult the
international norm in parallel cases for its persuasive value. This
method is akin to the practice of state courts examining other state
court decisions for their persuasive value.
II. The U.S. Supreme Court's Growing Acceptance of
International Human Rights and Other Foreign Law
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has begun to address the
influence of international and foreign law with a significant number of
decisions advocating acceptance of these sources of law. The
Supreme Court Justices have also commented on the issue when off
the bench.
In the 1920s, Louis Brandeis, then a labor lawyer litigating before
the U.S. Supreme Court, included sociological and economic data in
his briefs. His distinctive briefs became known as "Brandeis Briefs."
The data in these briefs was eventually accepted and relied on by the
Court as a source of law.64 Currently, there is an emerging practice
among human rights advocates to file amicus briefs with the Court
urging, under various theories, that the Court accept international
human rights norms or foreign law as a source of domestic law. This
type of brief could be labeled the "Connie de la Vega Brief" after the
human rights attorney and law professor.65 Professor de la Vega has
developed compelling arguments for acceptance of international law
63. Id. at 32 (referring to McColluch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honderas, 372 U.S. 10, 20-21 (1963)).
64. For a discussion of the origin and nature of the Brandeis Brief, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 Duke L.J. 624, 628
n. 15
65. Connie de la Vega has participated in amicus briefs asserting international
human rights law. See Brief of the Employment Law Center, et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner, United States v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 910 (1995) (Nos. 94-1941,
94-2107), 1995 WL 702836 (citing international norms in support of equal educational
rights for women); Brief for the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and
Wales, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1628523 (arguing that under the international
human rights norm that capital punishment cannot be applied to those under 18).
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in a number of scholarly works.66 She is closely associated with the
non-governmental organization Human Rights Advocates, based in
Berkeley, California, where she has served on its board. Human
Rights Advocates, usually with de la Vega as counsel and assistance
from her University of San Francisco Human Rights Law Clinic, has
been amicus in a number of significant cases urging the Supreme
Court to look to international human rights law as a source of
domestic law. 67  Through de la Vega and others, the Court is
repeatedly exposed to such arguments.6
66. Connie de la Vega, Amici Curiae Urge the U.S. Supreme Court to Consider
International Human Rights Law in Juvenile Death Penalty Case, 42 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1041 (2001-2002).
67. See Brief for the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales,
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1628523; Brief Amici Curiae Human Rights Advocates
and the University of Minnesota Human Rights Center in Support of Respondents,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 399226;
Brief for Human Rights Advocates and Erika Smith as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494)
1986 WL 728375. Connie de la Vega has also been amicus to cases which the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to review. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson,
122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997) and Domingues v.
Nevada, 114 Nev. 783 (Nev. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 963 (1999).
68. It is noteworthy that in the hate-speech case, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343
(2003), there was no brief from human rights advocates. One can only assume that
strategic considerations silenced these advocates. There is often a conflict between
civil libertarians advocating free speech and civil rights proponents advocating
equality. Perhaps human rights advocates did not want to enter this fray in order to
preserve coalition building or funding purposes. Amicus briefs filed: Brief of Amicus
Curiae Council of Conservative Citizens Filed in Support of Respondents, (No. 01-
1107) 2002 WL 31051379; Brief Amicus Curiae The Rutherford Institute in Support
of Respondents, (No. 01-1107) 2002 WL 31051381; Brief of Amicus Curiae The
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression in Support of
Respondents, (No. 01-1107) 2002 WL 31085675; Brief Amici Curiae The Anti-
Defamation League, People for the American Way Foundation, Human Rights
Campaign, National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, National Conference
for Community and Justice, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Hadassah, The Women's Zionist Organization of America, Inc., American Jewish
Committee, Jewish Council for Public Affairs, Commission of Social Action of
Reform Judaism, American-Arab Anti-Defamation Committee, National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force in Support of Neither Party, (No. 01-1107) 2002 WL 1870239;
Brief of Amicus Curiae State of California in Support of Petitioner, (No. 01-1107)
2002 WL 1870248; Brief Amicus Curiae The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in
Support of Petitioner, (No. 01-1107) 2002 WL 1870253; Brief of the States of New
Jersey, Arizona, Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Vermont as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioner, (No. 01-1107) 2002 WL 1870275; Arizona, California,
Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, Oklahoma, Utah, and Washington as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, (No. 01-1107) 2002 WL 32134823.
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A robust dialogue on the role of international and foreign law in
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence is now taking place in literature and
on the lecture circuit. Supreme Court Justices have been at the
forefront of this debate. In 1994, shortly before his retirement,
Justice Blackmun delivered an address honoring Louis Henkin, which
was later adapted for The Yale Law Journal.69 Justice Blackmun
critiqued the Court's decision in Stanford v. Kentucky," which upheld
the death penalty for minors over the age of 16. Justice Blackmun
dissented from the opinion and the opinion was later reversed five to
four after he left the Court.71 He observed:
During my thirty-four years of service on the federal bench, the
United States has become economically and politically intertwined
with the rest of the world as never before. International human
rights conventions - still a relatively new idea when I came to the
bench in 1959 - have created mutual obligations that are accepted
throughout the world. As we approach the 100th anniversary of
The Paquete Habana, then, it perhaps is appropriate to remind
ourselves that the United States is part of the global community,
that "[i]nternational law is part of our law," and that courts should
construe our statutes, our treaties, and our Constitution, where
possible, consistently with "the customs and usage's of civilized
nations.,
72
Justice Blackmun concluded this address by stating that he looked
forward "to the day when the majority of the Supreme Court will
inform almost all of its decisions almost all of the time with a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind.
7 3
In 1997 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor acknowledged off the
bench that "[t]he flow of ideas from our Court to other tribunals
around the world is well-chronicled, but we have not seen fit to
reciprocate in kind. I think this will change, as we are asked to define
our role within the international regime." 74 In 2002, she asserted that
"[a]lthough international law and the law of other nations are rarely
binding upon our decisions in U.S. courts, conclusions reached by
69. Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE
L.J. 39 (1994).
70. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
71. Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
72. Blackmun, supra note 69, at 49.
73. Id. at 49.
74. Sandra Day O'Conner, Federalism of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. &
POL. 35, 41 (1997).
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other countries and by the international community should at times
constitute persuasive authority in American courts.""
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concluded a Cardozo Memorial
Lecture by stating:
In my view, comparative analysis emphatically is relevant to the
task of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights. We
are the losers if we neglect what others can tell us about endeavors
to eradicate bias against women, minorities, and other
disadvantaged groups. For irrational prejudice and rank
discrimination are infectious in our world. In this reality, as well as
the determination to counter it, we all share.76
In his 2003 keynote address to the American Society of
International Law,77 Justice Stephen Breyer quoted with full approval
Justice Ginsburg's endorsement of comparative analysis in
interpreting the Constitution and explained the pragmatic reasons
"why so many of us [on the Supreme Court] have taken this
position." He added, "Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter
have referred to comparative foreign experience in several important
recent opinions. And I have tried to explain, both in opinions and
public remarks, why I believe foreign experience is often important to
our work."'78
Justice Breyer's remarks generated a strong response from
Pepperdine University School of Law Professor Roger Alford who
described what he considered a misuse of international sources to
interpret the Constitution.79 Justice Antonin Scalia has, of course,
also been a strong critic of using international human rights norms as
a source of law for constitutional interpretation. His lively debate
75. Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address Before the American Society of
International Law (March 16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC'Y. INT'L. L. PROC. 348, 350
(2002).
76. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An
International Human Rights Dialogue, Fifty-First Cardozo Memorial Lecture
(February 11, 1999), in 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253,282 (1999).
77. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address Before the American Society of
International Law Proceedings (Apr. 2-5, 2003), in 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 265,
265 (2003).
78. Id. at 265. See also Pintz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (stating that international and foreign law rulings on constitutional
issues facing the Court "cast an empirical light on the consequences of different
solutions to a common legal problem").
79. Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the
Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L. L. 57 (2004).
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with Justice Breyer on the issue at American University in 2005
clearly delineates his position t' which he summed up as follows:
Now, my theory of what I do when I interpret the American
Constitution is I try to understand what it meant, what was
understood by the society to mean when it was adopted .... If you
have that philosophy, obviously foreign law is irrelevant with one
exception: Old English law, because phrases like 'due process,' the
'right of confrontation' and things of that sort were all taken from
English law. So the reality is I use foreign law more than anybody• • 81
on the Court. But it's all old English law.
In recent non-racial discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged the influence of human rights norms. The Court has
been most willing to accept this source of law with regard to the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. The term "cruel and unusual" is general and lacks
specific content. The term is an accordion principle that is subject to
a range of meanings depending on the context. Historically, the
Court has held that the concept of "cruel and unusual" is one that
changes with the times and should be interpreted in context of
current civilized standards. The fountainhead precedent for this rule
is the 1958 case of Trop v. Dulles, which equated the cruel and
unusual standard to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."'82 In 1988, a plurality of the Court
accepted that the standard of decency forbade capital punishment of
anyone under age 16 at the time of the offense.83 The next year, the
Court found, five to four, that current standards of decency did not
forbid the execution of anyone who had committed a crime between
the ages of 15 and 18.' The Court also held that year that the Eighth
Amendment did not categorically exempt mentally retarded persons
from execution.85 In 2002, the Court abandoned this position and
held in Adkins v. Virginia86 that according to standards of decency,
80. See Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, A Conversation on the Relevance of
Foreign Law for American Constitutional Adjudication (Jan. 13, 2005),
<www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2005/050113.cfm> (follow 'Press Release and
Full Transcript') (visited Oct. 14, 2006).
81. Id
82. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958).
83. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
84. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-371 (1989).
85. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
86. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
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the execution of mentally retarded persons is unusual, if not cruel. In
2005, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that the execution of
anyone who had committed an offence before their eighteenth
birthday was forbidden.' In Adkins, and even more clearly in Roper,
the Court identified foreign and international norms as relevant to
their interpretation of the Eighth Amendment and the meaning of
"cruel and unusual punishment."
The multiple opinions of Roper give us the best insight into the
Court's view of the usefulness of international sources for
interpreting the Constitution. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, acknowledged the broad nature of the Eighth Amendment's
language: "The prohibition against 'cruel and unusual punishments,'
like other expansive language in the Constitution, must be interpreted
according to its text, by considering history, tradition, and precedent,
and with due regard for its purpose and function in the constitutional
design."8 He then referred to the Trop v. Dulles guideline: "[to]
implement this framework we have established the propriety and
affirmed the necessity of referring to 'the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society' to determine
which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and
unusual."89  Although Justice Kennedy based his opinion on the
strong trend among states to prohibit capital punishment for those
under 18, he concluded his opinion with a significant discussion about
the force of international human rights law on the meaning of the
cruel and unusual punishment prohibition. He observed that "Article
37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which every country in the world has ratified save for the United
States and Somalia, contains an express prohibition on capital
punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under 18." 90 He also
cited specific articles of other human rights treaties, which proscribe
capital punishment for those under the age of 18: the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6(5)91
(which he noted was signed and ratified by the United States, but
87. Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
88. Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 561 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-101).
90. Id. at 576 (citing the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37(a),
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept 2, 1990)).
91. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(5), Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 and signed and ratified by the
United States). 0
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subject to a reservation regarding capital punishment of those under
age 18); the American Convention on Human Rights, Article 4(5)92;
and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,
Article 5(3).93 The United States did not sign either of these last two
treaties. Briefs of amici as well as the respondent brought these
sources to the attention of the Roper Court.9 ' Justice Kennedy also
cited foreign domestic law and noted that no other country in the
world currently gives official sanction to the execution of juveniles.95
Regarding the importance of these international sources, Justice
Kennedy stated that:
[T]he stark reality [is] that the United States is the only country in
the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty. This reality does not become controlling, for the
task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our
responsibility. Yet at least from the time of the Court's decision in
Trop the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to
international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual
punishments. 96
Justice Kennedy concluded with the comment that while the
opinion of the world community does not control U.S. domestic law,
it does provide respected and significant confirmation for decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court. He also noted that "[i]t does not lessen our
fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge
that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other
nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same
rights within our own heritage of freedom."9 Thus, Justice Kennedy,
as well as Justices Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens, who joined
the opinion, appear quite open to the idea of international human
rights law influencing constitutional interpretation of "cruel and
92. American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica art.
4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 146 (entered into force July 19, 1978).
93. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 5(3), July 11,
1990, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/ 24.9/49 (1990) (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999).
94. Roper, 543 U.S. at 579.
95. "[O]nly seven countries other than the United States have executed juvenile
offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and China. Since then each of these countries has either
abolished capital punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice."
Id. at 577.
96. Id. at 575.
97. Id. at 578.
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unusual punishment," and likely in regard to other "expansive
language" in the Constitution.
Justice O'Connor dissented in Roper but conceded a role for
international human rights law in Eighth Amendment interpretation.
She stated:
But this nation's evolving understanding of human dignity certainly
is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the
values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary, we should
not be surprised to find congruence between domestic and
international values, especially where the international community
has reached clear agreement - expressed in international law or in
the domestic laws of individual countries - that a particular form of
punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human rights.98
She went to some effort to distance herself from Justice Scalia's
position, though she agreed with his result, because she believed the
domestic consensus controlled and found no such consensus in the
United States on this issue.99
In his dissent to Roper, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia expressed outrage at the concept of
98. Id. at 605.
99. She stated,
In short, the evidence of an international consensus does not alter my
determination that the Eighth Amendment does not, at this time, forbid
capital punishment of 17-year-old murderers in all cases. Nevertheless, I
disagree with Justice Scalia's contention... that foreign and international
laws have no place in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Over the
course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to foreign
and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of
decency. This inquiry reflects the special character of the Eighth
Amendment, which, as the Court has long held, draws its meaning directly
from the maturing values of civilized society. Obviously, American law is
distinctive in many respects, not least where the specific provisions of our
Constitution and the history of its exposition so dictate .... But this
Nation's evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is neither wholly
isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in other
countries. On the contrary, we should not be surprised to find congruence
between domestic and international values, especially where the
international community has reached clear agreement - expressed in
international law or in the domestic laws of individual countries - that a
particular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human
rights. At least, the existence of an international consensus of this nature
can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine
American consensus. The instant case presents no such domestic consensus,
however, and the recent emergence of an otherwise global consensus does
not alter that basic fact.
Id. at 604-05 (citations omitted).
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an evolving Constitution. Justice Scalia exclaimed, "[w]hat a mockery
today's opinion makes of Hamilton's expectation, announcing the
Court's conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has changed
over the past 15 years - not, mind you, that this Court's decision 15
years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution has changed "00
Justice Scalia had a similarly caustic response to the use of
international law. He noted that the United States made a
reservation regarding the issue of capital punishment of persons
under 18 when ratifying the ICCPR. Justice Scalia noted that
'tu]nless the Court has added to its arsenal the power to join and
ratify treaties on behalf of the United States, I cannot see how this
[evidence] ... favors, rather than refutes, its position."'' 1 The remarks
by Justice Scalia emphasize that a majority of the Court gave
substantial weight to international law."°
Justice Scalia's dissent is noteworthy in another respect. While
decrying the changing Constitution in interpreting the broad language
of the Eighth Amendment, he recognized that language of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses are similarly broad. These
clauses have also been subject to the same type of interpretation.0 3
In Lawrence v. Texas, the 2003 sodomy case, the Court not only
reaffirmed the evolving nature of the Due Process Clause, 1' but also
recognized the impact of international human rights norms,"°5 citing
the European Court of Human Rights. '°6 The federal courts have also
100. Id. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis original).
101. Id. at 622.
102. The force of Justice Scalia's argument suggests that proponents of using
human rights norms to develop domestic issues should be cautious in the manner
international norms are utilized. See Roger P. Alford, Misusing International
Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (2004).
103. "[W]e have certainly applied the 'maturing values' rationale to give brave
new meaning to other provisions of the Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause." Roper, 543 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558, regarding equal protection; United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1996); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
regarding due process).
104. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-73.
105. In Lawrence, a number of the amici briefs addressed international human
rights law. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Mary Robinson et al. in Support of
Petitioners, (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151; Brief of the American Bar Association as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164108; Amicus Brief
of Human Rights Campaign et. al, in Support of Petitioners, (No. 02-102) 2003 WL
152347,
106. Justice Kennedy, for a five justice majority, observed that
[A]lmost five years before Bowers was decided the European Court of
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recognized international human rights law when interpreting the
Alien Torts Claims Act and Torture Victims Protection Act. 7
The two new members of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Samuel Alito, have yet to hear a case on this issue. However,
their attitudes may be gleaned from their testimonies during their
confirmation hearings. In the Senate Hearings for his nomination,
Justice Roberts was asked, "[w]hat, if anything, is the proper role of
foreign law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions?" While limiting his
answer to the use of such law "as precedent on the meaning of
American law," he identified two areas of "concern." One area is
that foreign judges are not accountable to the American people as is
the President and the Senate. The second area is that such reliance
does not sufficiently restrain judges since they could pick precedents
"like looking over a crowd and picking your friends."1"8 The first area
is a concern for integrity of our democratic system and the second is a
concern of separation of powers - that judges be confined to their
judicial role and not act like legislators.
While Roberts perhaps left the impression that he is
unequivocally opposed to the use of foreign and international law by
the Supreme Court, his answer - like many others throughout the
hearings - was carefully nuanced. He limited his remarks to both
"foreign law" and to its precedential value for Supreme Court
interpretations of the Constitution. His response left open the
possibility that international human rights law may play an
interpretive role because it is distinguished from "foreign law" -
specifically the national law of foreign nations. During the
Human Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers and to today's
case. An adult male resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing
homosexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The
laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right. He alleged that he had
been questioned, his home had been searched, and he feared criminal
prosecution. The court held that the laws proscribing the conduct were
invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-73.
107. Since the 1980 case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.,1980),
federal courts have consistently allowed a cause of action based on international
customary human rights law proscribing torture. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d. 232
(2d Cir. 1995) (allowing a cause of action against a de facto governmental official in
the former Yugoslavia for systematic rape in violation of customary international
human rights law); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004)
(stating that "[f]or two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the
United States recognizes the law of nations").
108. Stolberg & Liptak, supra note 2.
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confirmation hearings, Justice Alito's responses also referred to
"foreign law." He stated, "I don't think it appropriate or useful to
look to foreign law in interpreting the provisions of our Constitution.
I think the framers would be stunned by the idea that the Bill of
Rights is to be interpreted by taking a poll of countries of the
world." '
In the area of constitutional civil rights law, no issue has troubled
the Court more in recent times than affirmative action. Using
comparative analysis, I examine the extent to which international
human rights law, explicitly or implicitly, has influenced U.S.
constitutional law. In my conclusion, I also briefly explore the
potential of international human rights law to influence a right to
slavery reparations for African Americans.
III. Affirmative Action
A. Affirmative Action in International Human Rights Law
International human rights law supports the use of affirmative
action. The primary treaties signed and ratified by the Unites States
which encourage affirmative action measures are the International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR).
The CERD" not only exempts racial affirmative action from its
prohibition against discrimination, but also explicitly encourages
signatories to employ this device.1"' Article 1, section 1 of the CERD
defines racial discrimination as "any distinction.., based on race ...
which has the purpose or effect of ... impairing the... enjoyment...
on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social cultural or any other field of public
life."" 2  Section 4 of that Article states the exception for making
distinctions based on race:
109. Felix G. Rohatyn, Deadto the World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23.
110. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force by the United
States on Nov. 20, 1994).
111. For a detailed consideration of CERD and ICCPR as they affect civil rights
efforts, see Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s: New Treaty Law Could
Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 423 (1997).
112. Id. at Art. 1 § 1.
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"Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups.., in order to
insure.., equal enjoyment ... of human rights and fundamental
freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided
however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the
maintenance of separate rights or different racial groups and that
they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were
taken have been achieved. 113
Article 1 of the CERD thus exempts race-based affirmative
action from its discrimination prohibition as long as it does not result
in a permanent system of separate rights beyond the time required to
eradicate the problem. The exemption is broad enough to include
both backward-looking and forward-looking affirmative action.
Backward-looking affirmative action addresses specific past
discrimination and provides a remedy for it."' The purpose of
forward-looking affirmative action is to remedy current racial
discrimination and advance the educational atmosphere for all by
creating diversity in students and faculty.1 '5
Article 2, section 2 of the CERD mandates that signatories
"[s]hall, when the circumstances so warrant, take.., concrete
measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of
certain racial groups. ' ' 1 6 The language of Article 2 is even broader
113. Id at Art. 1 § 4 (emphasis added).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1989) (hiring quotas
ordered by the Alabama State Police were discriminatory against African-
Americans).
115. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (University of Michigan
Law School denied past discrimination, but asserted the goal of a diverse student
body for pedagogical reasons); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
In Wygant, a slightly different forward-looking justification was asserted. The
argument was that the presence of an African-American faculty member would
provide a role model to African-American students. The claim failed, but the
Supreme Court did not preclude the future use of the "role model" theory as an end
where the affirmative action means was more narrowly tailored. Id.
116. The full Article provides,
States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in the social,
economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure
the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or
individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full
and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These
measures shall in no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of
unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for
which they were taken have been achieved.
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Article 2(2), Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force by the United States
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than the first article and applies to forward-looking affirmative action
with a diversity rationale. A lack of racial diversity in a public
educational institution is arguably an instance "when the
circumstances so warrant." Future "adequate development" of a
group also justifies diversity which only benefits the targeted group at
school, or in the workplace."7 Article 2 does not require that a
diverse environment benefit all persons. Article 2 also appears to
refer to a distributive justice or results-oriented equality rather than
solely means or opportunity equality. Again, the language of the
Article - "to ensure the adequate development" - supports this
meaning.""
Although the United States ratified the CERD in 1994, it did so
with its usual extensive RUDs. The United States included a
reservation that it will not recognize any additional protections
against discrimination other than those provided in the Constitution.
The United States also declared that the CERD is not self-
executing." 9
Connie De La Vega concluded that in spite of these limitations
imposed by the United States in its participation in the CERD, "civil
rights advocates have many avenues available to make use of the
treaty provisions. '' 12  She singles out affirmative action, which she
on Nov. 20, 1994) (emphasis added).
117. The forward-looking justification of benefiting the enterprise of employers
poses a more difficult question. For example, if an enterprise seeks to market its
product (i.e. soft drinks or education) to African Americans, it may want to insure
that a significant number of its employees are of that group - if nothing else, to avoid
a boycott inspired by Jesse Jackson. A public college may want to make sure its
faculty and administration is racially representative of its targeted consumer student
population. If marketing is its primary goal, perhaps it falls outside of the goal of
"adequate development" of the group. A non-governmental enterprise may be
beyond the treaty's reach, as it is addressed to the governmental parties, at least in
the absence of national anti-discrimination legislation. Even where such legislation
exists, justifying discrimination as catering to consumers may well be problematic.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D.Tex. 1981) (court
rejected male businessmen's customer preference for young attractive female cabin
stewards as a justification of gender employment discrimination).
118. Theodor Meron provides an excellent critique of the language and drafting of
the CERD in The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 AM. J. INT'L. L. 283 (1985).
Meron complains of "deficient drafting" of some of the major provisions, but that the
"imperfect text" is understandable in view of the speed and politics of the process.
Nevertheless, he believes that in many instances it was avoidable. Id at 316.
119. For the complete text of the RUDs, see International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 Cong. Rec. S7634-02 (1994).
120. De la Vega, supra note 111 at 471.
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says "is not only endorsed but required"'' by the CERD. The RUDs
that the United States attached to the ratification of the CERD
present a significant problem with the treaty's utility. The declaration
of non self-enforcement is particularly problematic. However, Gay
McDougall of the International Human Rights Law Group in
Washington D.C., points out that a declaration carries less weight
than a reservation and that this declaration may well violate the
objective and purpose of the convention which would make it void
under international law. 122
The ICCPR is the other major human rights treaty relating to
affirmative action which has been ratified by the United States. The
treaty's provisions and RUDs made by the United States are quite
similar to the CERD. The ICCPR contains a general statement of
equal rights in Article 2(1), and Article 2(2), which may be
interpreted as supporting affirmative action. Article 2 states that
"each state party ... undertakes to take the necessary steps ... to
adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to give
effect to the rights recognized in the present covenant." The U.N.
Human Rights Committee has recognized that under this treaty "not
all differentiation of treatment constitutes discrimination if the
criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if
the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the
Covenant."'"
There are also other significant international treaties, to which
the United States is not a party, which accept and even mandate
affirmative action. The European Court of Human Rights frequently
makes decisions that are adhered to by signatories. The European
multilateral human rights treaties have general provisions about equal
rights, but say little about race-based affirmative action.' 4 Gender
121. Id.
122. Gay J. McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International Regime."
The Domestic Relevance of International Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 40 How. L. J. 571, 589-90 (1997).
123. De la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s." New Treaty Law Could Help
Immensely, supra note 111, at 433 (citing U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 37th Sess.,
984th mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21Rev.l/Add.1 (1989)).
124. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 and its various
protocols; European Social Charter (Revised), May 3, 1996, E.T.S. No. 163. Cf
[European] Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb. 1,
1995, E.T.S. No 157, 34 I.L.M. 351 (1995). Article 4(2), which requires the parties to
"take adequate measures.., to promote ... full and effective equality ... [for]
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affirmative action, however, has received some attention in the
European system. In Marschall v. Land- Westfalen,' the European
Court of Justice upheld a national rule giving priority to women for a
governmental teaching position, where the candidates are equally
qualified. The Court rejected the claim that the country's rule
violated the European Council Directive interpreting the general
gender equality provision of the European Charter. The Council
Directive provided in Article 1(1) that the provision meant "no
discrimination whatsoever." The Court observed, however, that
Article 2(4) provides that Article 1(1) shall "be without prejudice to
measures to promote equal opportunity.., by removing existing
inequalities which affect women's opportunities."'26  This standard
could also be appropriate for race-based affirmative action.
B. Affirmative Action in the US. Supreme Court
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court decided landmark affirmative
action cases, Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, which
involved the University of Michigan's law school and undergraduate
school respectively. Without considering stare decisis, the Court
national minorit[ies]." It adds that parties "shall take due account of the specific
conditions of the persons belonging to national minorities." Article 24(1) indicates
that the provisions, however, are not enforced by any court, but left to the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to monitor.
125. Case C-409/95, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1997 E.C.R. 865.
126. Id. at 21-22.
127. In the American system, affirmative action favoring African Americans
should not require as much justification as gender affirmative action because African
Americans have suffered such egregious discrimination and because the Fourteenth
Amendment was specifically designed to protect African Americans. However, the
Supreme Court applies intermediate scrutiny to gender discrimination cases,
including affirmative action, and applies strict scrutiny to race cases. If gender and
racial standards of review are the same in Marschall, then European rules would be
at odds with the U.S. Supreme Court's racial affirmative action decision in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986). In Wygant, the Court required
"convincing evidence" of specific past racial discrimination and narrow tailoring of
the affirmative action remedy. While Marschall specifically allowed gender
affirmative action for equally qualified employees, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
resolved the issue of race-based affirmative action. In Taxman v. Piscataway, 91 F.3d
1547 (3d Cir. 1996), a court prohibited a school board from laying off a white teacher
in lieu of a black teacher who was equally qualified. While waiting to be reviewed by
the Supreme Court, the case was cut off by civil rights advocates who settled with the
school board, mooting the case and avoiding a Supreme Court ruling on the issue of
equal qualifications, Piscataway v. Taxman, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997). Wygant and
Piscatawayboth involved layoffs, not promotions, as in Marschall. This could explain
the difference in the evaluation of the tailoring plans.
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essentially ratified Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Bakke v.
University of California. Grutter unambiguously required strict
scrutiny under equal protection but found that diversity could be a
compelling state interest for higher education institutions. The means
used by the law school was found to be narrowly tailored, but the
means used by the undergraduate school was not. These cases are the
most recent in a line of affirmative action cases spanning almost three
decades.
The earliest treatment of affirmative action by the Supreme
Court was the 1978 landmark decision of Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke.'28  The Court struck down a race-based
affirmative action plan conceived by the University of California,
Davis School of Medicine.'29  In spite of the decision against
affirmative action, Justice Powell's plurality opinion was a boost for
affirmative action because it provided guidelines on how to draw an
affirmative action plan that could survive the Court's scrutiny.30
Powell declined to condemn all affirmative action programs.' He
asserted that affirmative action could not only be a remedy for past
discrimination, but it could also be forward-looking by enabling
diversity in educational institutions.'32 Although diversity in schools is
a legitimate governmental objective, setting aside a number of
reserved seats for only minority students is an improper way of
achieving this objective. In Powell's view, the Harvard system of
providing a non-mathematical "plus" factor in minority applications
would be an appropriate means if employed by a public school
covered by the Equal Protection Clause.'33
While measuring the impact of Supreme Court cases is difficult
to predict, the ultimate decisions of the Court, rather than the reasons
for the decisions, may have a stronger impact on future decisions
made by the Supreme Court and lower courts.' In Bakke, although
128. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
129. Id. at 272.
130. See id. at 316-318.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 312.
133. See id. at 316-317.
134. For example, the rationale of Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294
(1955), is that state-compelled segregation is unequal because it deprives black
children of an equal educational opportunity by imposing psychological damage that
undermines their learning ability. Yet courts consistently struck down segregation of
every sort, from public water fountains to state employment, without any support
except for Brown.
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Justice Powell's comments are arguably dicta, many perceived his
decision as an endorsement of affirmative action in education and
other areas.
However, Bakke did not address the proper level of scrutiny
required under the Equal Protection Clause for policies benefiting
minorities. The appropriate standard of scrutiny was the focus of the
Court's affirmative action opinions for the next decade. In 1989, the
Court finally resolved the issue in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson
Co.'35 by declaring strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review for
state affirmative action programs. In 1995, the Court confirmed in
Aderand v. Pena'3 6 that strict scrutiny also applies to federal
programs.
The Court had long held that racial classifications are subject to
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, requiring the
governmental end to be "compelling" and that the means chosen be
"necessary" or "narrowly tailored" to achieve that end.'37 Few cases
prior to the 1980s presented the issue of racial classification benefiting
minorities and it appeared that strict scrutiny was limited to
classifications that disadvantaged minorities. In the late 1970s,
beginning with Bakke, the Supreme Court Justices battled over the
proper level of scrutiny for affirmative action cases. Justices Marshall
and Brennan took the position that benign racial classifications
should be subject only to intermediate scrutiny. They argued that
strict scrutiny was inappropriate because addressing discrimination
against African Americans was the intention of the Equal Protection
Clause and that legislative action which benefited minorities was not
suspect, because non-minorities had not been historically
discriminated against. Justices Marshall and Brennan argued that
strict scrutiny was especially inappropriate for affirmative action
programs implemented by the federal government, which had an
express mandate in Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enforce equal protection."
In affirmative action cases of the 1980s and early 1990s, it was not
always clear which level of scrutiny the court was applying, but
affirmative action programs usually survived the Supreme Court's
135. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
136. Aderand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
137. The standard is often traced to Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), but was most clearly and most often articulated during the Warren Court era.
138. See, e.g., Marshall's and Brennan's dissenting opinions in Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, and Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
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standard of review. In Metro Broadcasting,'3 9 the Federal
Communication Commission's rule favoring minority ownership
under certain limited circumstances was upheld, five to four, with
Justice Brennan writing for the majority. His language suggested
something less than strict scrutiny. In Fullilove v. Klutznik,'4° the
same majority upheld the "minority business enterprise" provision of
the Public Works Employment Act which required at least ten
percent of federal funds granted for public works be set aside for
businesses owned by minorities. While the Metro Broadcasting plan
was justified as promoting diversity in broadcast content, the Fullilove
plan was designed to rectify past discrimination by awarding federal
contracts to underrepresented minorities, as demonstrated by
nationwide studies. Again, Fullilove fell short of declaring
intermediate scrutiny as the rule for reviewing affirmative action
programs, but the Court applied a standard of review less than strict
scrutiny.
A major shift came in 1989, which civil rights advocates often
refer to as "the term from hell.''. In Croson,'2 a five-to-four
majority" explicitly ruled that the affirmative action construction set-
asides were subject to, and violated strict scrutiny. Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion language strongly approved the strict
standard, but she repeated in a number of later affirmative action
cases that strict scrutiny was only strict in theory and fatal in fact.'"
Thus, strict scrutiny, especially as applied to affirmative action,
139. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
140. 488 U.S. 448 (1980).
141. In the 1989 term, the Supreme Court also decided Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and Wards Cove v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), both
gutting some of the prime employment discrimination protections of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. These protections against employment discrimination were
substantially restored by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991.
142. 488 U.S. 469.
143. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, White, and Scalia
agreed that strict scrutiny should be the standard of review for affirmative action
claims. Justice Stevens' concurrence did not address the level of scrutiny required.
144. See, e.g., Aderand, 515 U.S. at 237 ("Finally we wish to dispel the notion that
strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory but fatal in fact,"' quoting Justice Marshall's
concurrence in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519). Justice O'Connor also elaborated, "ft]he
unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial
discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and
government is not disqualified from acting in response to it." O'Connor cited United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987), as a recent example where all members
of the Court agreed that a compelling interest existed for the court-ordered
affirmative action regarding the Alabama State Police.
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may not be quite as strict as we had come to believe. Croson
presented a good argument for upholding an affirmative action
program and the city essentially copied the affirmative action
program upheld in Fulliove.14 ' However, following the plan exactly
also doomed it. As in Fullilove, the City of Richmond included
Alutes, an Alaskan native group, among the minorities deserving
special benefits. Because there was no documented discrimination
found against Alutes in Richmond, it was difficult to argue that the
affirmative action program had been narrowly tailored under the
strict scrutiny test. It also did not help that the majority of
Richmond's city council members, which had adopted the plan, were
black.
The final blow to affirmative action came in Aderand v. Pena."
Neither Fullilove nor Metro Broadcasting had been explicitly
overruled in Croson, which left open what appeared to be a
compelling argument for distinguishing these cases. Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause, which was indisputably intended to address
discrimination against former slaves. Accordingly, less than strict
scrutiny should be applied to race-based affirmative action by the
federal government. One could argue that the Equal Protection
Clause supplies a compelling justification, even if strict scrutiny is
used. Aderand rejected this argument and explicitly overruled
Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting on this point. However, Aderand
did not address the assertion in Metro Broadcasting that diversity
could be a sufficient justification for affirmative action.
In Croson and Aderand, the Court used a colorblind standard for
the Equal Protection Clause rather than the racial subordination
model.1 17 The colorblind rule is that any racial classifications, even
affirmative action programs, are subject to strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause because they are not colorblind. To survive
strict scrutiny, an affirmative action program must serve a compelling
145. 448 U.S. 448.
146. 515 U.S. 200.
147. These alternative theories can be traced to Justice Harlan's first dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). However, under the facts of Plessy,
either theory would result in a violation of equal protection because racial
segregation was both colorblind and sent a message of racial subordination. In
supporting affirmative action programs, the governmental action is color conscious,
but does not send a message of racial subordination. Thus, the choice of equal
protection theories dictates the constitutional fate of affirmative action.
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governmental interest and it must be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. There are two possibilities for supplying a compelling
interest, looking backward to remedy past discrimination, and
compensating for current discrimination.
For instances of past discrimination, Aderand and its progeny
require a demonstration of past discrimination perpetrated by the
specific agency providing affirmative action.14 The past
discrimination must be specifically defined and supported by
sufficient documentation.'49 In this context, narrow tailoring requires
consideration of a number of factors to determine that the plan goes
no further than necessary to remedy the past discrimination.' These
factors include the flexibility of the plan and whether it requires a
rigid race-based quota, whether the plan is appropriately limited in
duration, and whether the plan unnecessarily trammels upon the
interests of third parties.
Whether a diversity justification could supply a compelling
interest was undecided for much longer. Indeed, as far back as 1978,
Justice Powell implied in Bakke that it did justify a compelling
interest.1 ' Bakke was taken as a green light for affirmative action
plans supported by a diversity justification, at least in the educational
context. However, Powell's view came under fierce attack, after the
switch in Croson and Aderand. Those cases required strict scrutiny
whereas Powell probably applied a less stringent standard. Also,
Powell's statement was merely dicta in a plurality opinion.
Furthermore, the argument went, although Metro Broadcasting
appeared to approve of diversity as a compelling governmental
interest, it was overruled in Aderand. Diversity was also arguably
rejected in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.2 In Wygant, the
Board of Education adopted a layoff program that protected minority
teachers.'53 The Board's justification was that its minority students
needed minority role models.' 4 The Court rejected this forward-
looking role-model theory as inadequate justification for race-based
affirmative action.
148. See 515 U.S. 200, 225-227.
149. See id. at 237.
150. See id. at 237-239.
151. 438 U.S.265.
152. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
153. Id. at 269-71.
154. Id. at 274.
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Although the Fifth Circuit in Hopwoodaccepted this approach, '55
the Supreme Court denied certiorari. There is a strong argument
favoring acceptance of the diversity justification. Though Justice
Powell's view may have been plurality dicta, it had long been
accepted as the law. Metro Broadcasting was only overruled
regarding the proper level of scrutiny, not whether diversity could be
a compelling interest, and Wygant involved a role-model theory
which was distinct from student diversity. The Fifth Circuit which
decided Hopwood bought the argument that Bakke was undermined.
In Hopwood, the non-minority applicants to the University of Texas
School of Law challenged the affirmative action program.5 6 The
school admitted no past discrimination of its own (Who would?), and
relied upon creation of diversity in its student body as justification for
the program. After the Supreme Court declined to review Hopwood,
the matter remained unclear. The Court finally agreed to hear the
Grutterand Gratzcases from Michigan 15 7 several years later.
In Grutter and Gratz, the University of Michigan similarly did
not admit past discrimination. Michigan's law school and
undergraduate school both claimed diversity as a compelling interest
for their affirmative action programs. Without determining whether
Bakke bound it, the Court essentially reaffirmed Powell's analysis,
but this time explicitly accepted diversity as a compelling interest for
race-based affirmative action in higher education admissions. The
law school's diversity goal in its admissions policy was to attain "a mix
of students with varying backgrounds and experiences who will
respect and learn from each other.'
5 8
In Grutter, Justice O'Connor declared'59 that strict scrutiny is no
longer fatal in fact. Although race-based classifications must be
reviewed under the standard of strict scrutiny, affirmative action
programs may still survive scrutiny since the standard of review "says
nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law." She adds
that "[n]ot every decision influenced by race is equally
objectionable. ' ' "W This appears to be yet another equal protection
155. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
156. Id. at 938.
157. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
158. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 313.
159. In Grutter, Justice O'Connor departs from her jurisprudential posture of
"incrementalism." For a study of incrementalism, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
160. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327. Many constitutional law scholars argue that the
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tier, "strict scrutiny lite," for racial affirmative action cases. 61  In
Grutter, Justice O'Connor finally reviewed an affirmative action
program that survived strict scrutiny.
Thus, we now have some guidelines as to how affirmative action
programs can survive strict scrutiny. In addition to specific past
discrimination, racial diversity in a higher education affirmative
action admissions program may also serve as a compelling interest.
Whether a particular program satisfies the narrow tailoring
requirement of strict scrutiny is more complex, but some guidelines
are provided by a comparison of the program in Grutter, which met
the standard, with the program in Gratz, which did not survive the
standard.
C. Comparing International Human Rights Norms with
Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
1. Diversity as a Sufficient End
In international human rights law, analysis of discrimination does
not formally use tiers of scrutiny as practiced by U.S. courts. The
international norm does require that race-based affirmative action be
justified, but at a lower level. Furthermore, affirmative action is
generally viewed as a duty of the nation rather than a mere permitted
activity. Diversity is not specified as a justification in the major
multilateral human rights treaties; however, the language regarding
justifications for affirmative action is quite broad and would certainly
include diversity.
We will first examine treaties (as referenced above) that address
affirmative action and which the United States has signed and
three equal protection tiers of the Warren Court era are breaking down. See, e.g.,
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Equal Protection After the Rational Basis Era: Is It Time to
Reassess the Current Standards of Review?: Tears for Tiers on the Rehnquist Court,
4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 350 (2002); Peter S. Smith, The Demise of the Three-Tier
Review: Has the United States Supreme Court Adopted a "Sliding Scale"Approach
To ward Equal Protection Jurisprudence?, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 475 (1997).
161. Constitutional law scholars now frequently refer to a "traditional" rational
basis review (see, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949)), and a rational basis review "with teeth" (see, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. Justice O'Connor's more recent opinions, especially
Grutter, suggest that a majority of the Court may now accept "strict scrutiny lite" for
race-based affirmative action, thereby moving closer to the Brennan/Marshall
intermediate scrutiny standard of review.
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ratified, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights1
62
(ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination6 3 (CERD). Because the United
States has ratified these treaties and the concept of rights in the
treaties is similar to those found in the United States, arguments
based on these treaties are particularly viable. Even if U.S. courts are
not specifically bound by these treaties,' 64 they are of considerable
persuasive value, and Supreme Court precedent requires that the
Constitution be interpreted consistently with these international
obligations.
In general, the ICCPR encompasses, in the jargon of
international human rights law, "first generation rights.' 65  These
human rights are primarily freedoms from governmental interference,
reserved by a fictional social contract. These include freedom of
speech, religion, and assembly, which are protected by the First
Amendment. A second covenant, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is generally viewed as providing
"second generation" rights. These rights grew out of the Socialist
movement of the early twentieth century and are characterized in
Franklin Roosevelt's famous Four Freedoms speech as "freedom
from want." '66 In general, second generation rights impose a duty on
government to take action to guarantee economic and social justice.
These rights were kept in a separate treaty largely because of the
perception that many nations (especially the United States) would
balk at accepting these concepts as "rights." The perception was
correct and the United States has yet to ratify this treaty, although it
was signed by President Jimmy Carter.' 67  The provisions of the
ICCPR are more palatable to the United States because they are
162. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, and ratified by the United States on
Sept. 8, 1992).
163. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969 and
ratified by the United States on Nov. 20, 1994).
164. See supra Part 1I (discussion of self-execution of treaties).
165. Burns H. Weston attributes the theory of three generations of rights to
French juridical writer Karal Vasak who derived it from the three demands of the
French Revolution: libertj, galit, and fraternitk. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 16-18 (Burns H. Weston & Richard P.
Claude eds., 1989).
166. President's Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941).
167. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (not ratified by the United States).
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perceived as more consistent with our tradition of rights.'68 Thus, in
addition to ratification, conceptualization of rights in first generation
terms makes the ICCPR more appealing as an interpretive aid to the
rights provisions in the U.S. Constitution. The CERD or "Race
Treaty" is also cast in first generation terms and ratified by the
United States, so it should have the same status as an interpretive
guide for U.S. law. The CERD may even be more powerful because
of its greater specificity.
As discussed above, several provisions of the ICCPR and the
CERD relate to affirmative action. First, the ICCPR provides for
equal protection under Article 2, declaring that the rights listed in the
treaty are to be provided without respect to "race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status." '169 Article 26 repeats the equal
protection admonition, but in similar general language. 70
While the tiered approach to standard of review is not explicit in
international human rights law, the U.N. Human Rights Committee
interprets the ICCPR as requiring a "legitimate" end and a
"reasonable" means,'71 which parallels low-level equal-protection
scrutiny in American constitutional law. There is no direct reference
to affirmative action in the ICCPR, however the exception to
prohibited discrimination would cover it.
172
Article 2, section 2 of the CERD provides that "[s]tates parties
shall... take.., special and concrete measures to ensure the
adequate development and protection of certain racial groups.,
173
The language of these treaties appears to include diversity as a
168. The third generation of rights, solidarity rights, are also at odds with the U.S.
conception of rights. Only cooperation of the nations of the world can effectively
secure these rights, such as peace and a clean and safe environment.
169. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976); Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General,
ST/LEG/SER.E/14 at 121, Dec. 31, 1995.
170. ICCPR, Article 26 provides:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
171. See de la Vega, supra note 111.
172. Id. at 433.
173. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, supra note 162.
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sufficient end. The conventional use of the term "development"
permits a forward-looking goal such as diversity.
2. Means Scrutiny
International human rights law does not explicitly require that
the means be necessary or narrowly tailored to achieve the end,
however the factors analyzed for means scrutiny are similar to those
used by the U.S. Supreme Court. One example is the requirement
that the affirmative action end when its goal has been achieved.
Justice Ginsburg employs this analysis in her concurrence in Grutter.
The Court's observation that race-conscious programs "must have a
logical end point".., accords with the international understanding
of affirmative action. The International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratified by the
United States in 1994... endorses 'special and concrete measures
to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain
racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of
guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights
and fundamental freedoms .... But such measures, the
Convention instructs [in Article 2(2ff)] "shall in no case entail as a
consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for
different racial groups after the objectives for which they were
taken have been achieved.'
'17 4
Justice Ginsburg also quotes Article 4(1) of the unratified
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, which approves of "[t]emporary special measures
aimed at accelerating de facto equality" that "shall be discontinued
when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have
been achieved.
1 75
The Supreme Court explicitly recognizes international human
rights law in Grutter, specifically with respect to phasing out
affirmative action programs when the objective of integration is
achieved. In international human rights law, race-based affirmative
action is explicitly allowed and even mandated. The Supreme Court
is less tolerant of race-based affirmative action. Its major equal
protection analytical tool is determining a level of scrutiny. After
many decisions regarding affirmative action, the Supreme Court
finally declared that race-based affirmative action is subject to strict
174. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (citations omitted).
175. Id.
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scrutiny, along with other race-based discrimination. International
human rights law does not speak of levels of scrutiny, but only bans
discrimination and accepts affirmative action. The international
standard of review appears to be most like the Court's rational basis
review or intermediate scrutiny.
For example, Article 4 of the CERD allows discrimination for
the "sole purpose" of "adequate advancement of certain racial or
ethnic groups ... in order to insure. .. equal enjoyment.., of human
rights and fundamental freedoms." Thus the only governmental
interest or purpose required to justify an affirmative action program
is advancement toward equality."' Advancing equality of rights is a
sufficient interest of the state. Traditionally, this would not satisfy the
"compelling interest" requirement of strict scrutiny in U.S. courts.
Rather, the Supreme Court has required remediation of specific
discrimination by a governmental agency to justify affirmative
action.1" The only limitation of Article 4 of the CERD is that the
special measures not create permanent separate rights for a group.
While this is one of the requirements of narrow tailoring under strict
scrutiny, that concept requires much more than international norms.' 78
However, the Court appears to be moving away from its traditional
standard of strict scrutiny toward "strict scrutiny lite," which is similar
to the standard favored by international human rights norms.
IV. Conclusion and Implications for Slavery Reparations
Claims
International human rights advocates have a number of strong
claims that the U.S. Supreme Court is bound, or should at least be
deeply influenced, by international human rights law. These claims
are first, that the United States is bound by treaties and customary
international law which are enforceable through international courts
or organizations. The second claim is that U.S. courts must enforce
international norms domestically. The third claim is that the U.S.
Supreme court is bound by its own precedent to interpret rights
provisions in the Constitution consistently with international
176. Ethnic groups are not listed in the CERD, but the context clearly refers to
any such group that is not enjoying equality.
177. E.g., Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
178. Examples of the requirement of "narrowly tailored" include no unnecessary
trammeling upon the rights of the majority, a remedy that is only for the precise
discrimination, and no use of general quotas based strictly on race.
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obligations of the United States, the interpretive mandate model.
Finally, under the persuasive model, U.S. courts should consult
international norms for persuasive value.
Efforts of early civil rights advocates, like W.E.B. Du Bois, to
employ the international enforcement model failed as a legal matter,
but their efforts had political impact on the behavior of U.S. courts.
The domestic enforcement model has been beset with a fusillade of
largely successful attacks that have limited the binding nature of
international human rights treaties on U.S. courts. Many of these
attacks, including the Bricker Amendment movement and the
practice of extensive RUDs, were efforts to quell the Civil Rights
Movement. The third model, the interpretive mandate, appears
viable, but is not often used by the Supreme Court. Most of the
Court's use of international human rights norms, and most of the
debate, has centered upon the persuasive model. The Court appears
to be implicitly accepting some international human rights norms. In
particular, the Court has considered international law in the
affirmative action area. Civil rights advocates have been met with
considerable opposition, and had only limited success, in efforts to get
the Supreme Court to consider international human rights norms.
However, there has been some recent movement by the Justices
toward acceptance of these norms as sources of law. This new
willingness to consider international law should encourage efforts of
civil rights advocates to argue for compliance with international
norms.
This analysis also has significant implications for slavery
reparation claims of African Americans. We may be entering the
generation of reparations in civil rights and human rights law. Some
claims for reparations made by Holocaust victims and World War II
Japanese internment prisoners have been successful in achieving
political settlements. African Americans' claims for slavery
reparations have gained momentum and credibility as a means of
compensation for racial discrimination. Litigation on this issue has
been initiated in a number of cases and on a number of theories of
liability, including international human rights law.'79  Lawsuits,
however, have rarely been successful, and large-scale political
179. For a summary of litigation on slavery reparations in the United States, see
Eric K. Yamamoto, Susan K. Serrano, & Michelle N. Rodriquez, American Racial
Justice on Trial - Again: African-American Reparations, Human Rights, and the
War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269 (2003).
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settlements are not yet on the horizon.
The theories of liability available to bring about slavery
reparations range from constitutional causes of action under the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, to contract law theories of
unjust enrichment. However, as outlined above, international human
rights norms appear to offer a particularly appropriate legal basis for
reparations - one which calls for continued exploration and
development.
There are few human rights that rise to the highest level of
protection in international law - and condemnation of slavery is
among them. These basic norms, referred to as jus cogens or
preemptory norms, find their source in customary international law"8
and the Vienna Convention,"' and are generally recognized as such
universal norms that they even override the consent of nation states
codified in treaties. Although the United States is not a signatory to
the Vienna Convention, it has conceded that it is bound by jus cogens
under customary law.'" Prohibition of slavery is without a doubt a jus
cogens norm binding on the United States. 83  Slavery is also
forbidden by long standing treaty law.18 The United States has signed
and ratified both the Slavery Convention 85 and its Supplementary
Convention."6 One provision of the latter prohibits states from
making reservations. The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law,
180. See Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to
International Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L. L. 585 (1988).
181. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention provides that a jus cogens norm is "a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 352.
182. For a summary of customary international law to which the United States
considers itself bound, including jus cogens, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987).
183. See, e.g., STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW - BEYOND THE NUREMBERG
LEGACY 105 (1997).
184. See, e.g., Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade, Dec. 20,
1841, 92 Consol. T.S. No. 437 (commonly known as the Treaty of London).
185. The Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 U.N.T.S. 253, (generally entered
into force, Mar. 9, 1927 and entered into force by the United States on Mar. 21,
1929).
186. The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 226 U.N.T.S. 3
(generally entered into force on Apr. 30, 1957, and entered into force by the United
States on Dec. 6, 1967).
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an authoritative summary of international law binding in the United
States, provides in section 702 that "a state violates international
law.., if it encourages or condones.., slavery or the slave trade.
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The remaining issue is whether the prohibition of slavery renders
reparations appropriate for such an egregious violation of
international human rights law. A cornerstone principle of U.S.
constitutional law,'m as well as international law, "8 is that wrongs are
to be compensated. Indeed the redress principle is considered so
fundamental that it is a jus cogens as well.19' The ICCPR, signed and
ratified by the United States, also specifies the right to an effective
remedy.'9 ' Again, the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
recognizes the right of slavery victims to avail themselves of
appropriate remedies.92  Justice Ginsburg, in discussing affirmative
action, observed that The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
"... aims to ensure that proclamations of equality and other civil
rights become more than aspirational. Article 8 states that
'[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy ... for acts violating
the fundamental rights' accorded him or her by the adhering nation's
Constitution or laws.'
'193
Given the unusually high status of the prohibition against slavery
187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987).
188. Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison recognized the principle that
wrongs are to be compensated in the following language: "The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to
afford that protection." He then cites Blackstone for the proposition, "it is a general
and indisputable rule that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by
suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded." 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
189. "There is no doubt that the obligation to provide for compensation as a
means to repair a wrongful act or a wrongful situation is a well established principle
of international law." Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, Study Concerning the
Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Preliminary Report, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/ 10 (1990).
190. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Reparations for the Descendants of American Slaves
Under International Law, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?: SLAVERY AND THE RAGING
DEBATE ON REPARATIONS 62-65 (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003) (an excellent
explication and more extensive citation of authorities of slavery reparations and
international law).
191. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art 2.
192. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 703(3) (1987).
193. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights
Dialogue (Feb. 11, 1999), in21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 255 (1999).
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and the right to redress in international law, slavery reparation claims
should have great legal force in international or domestic forums. As
stated above, constitutional language such as "cruel and unusual
punishment," "due process," and "equal protection" is sufficiently
universal for incorporating international norms. In the case of slavery
reparations, the most obvious constitutional provision for this
purpose, is the Thirteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment
was severely restricted by the post-reconstruction Supreme Court, but
in latter years the Court has allowed its expansion to badges and
incidents of slavery and to authority for Congress to forbid private
racial discrimination. 194 Allowing a remedy against private
corporations who have benefited financially from African-American
slavery or from governmental bodies who legalized and endorsed
slavery is not far-fetched. An appeal to international human rights
norms to explicate the meaning of the Civil War Amendments
strengthens these constitutional claims.
194. Jones v. Alfred Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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